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memorandum focuses on the divide among courts in interpreting Chapter 15. Part I describes the
statutory background of Chapter 15 and the principle of comity. Part II examines the varying
interpretations of Chapter 15 in relation to the statute’s text and purposes.
Discussion
I.

Chapter 15 Requirements for International Comity

Chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code applies whenever assistance from a U.S. bankruptcy
court is sought in connection with a foreign insolvency proceeding. 5 Under section 1509, a
foreign representative commences a Chapter 15 case by filing a petition for recognition of a
foreign proceeding in accordance with section 1515’s procedural requirements.6 Once an order
of recognition is granted, other sections of the Bankruptcy Code are triggered, including section
362, which imposes an automatic stay on all other actions pending against the debtor. 7
Most notably, when a petition for recognition is granted, Chapter 15 states that the U.S.
court “shall grant comity or cooperation to the foreign representative.” 8 Comity is “the
recognition which one nation allows within its territory to the legislative, executive or judicial
acts of another nation, having due regard both to international duty and convenience, and to the
rights of its own citizens.”9 Put simply, comity serves as a means for U.S. courts to defer to the
orders of foreign bankruptcy courts and gives foreign debtors relief—provided the laws of the
other country comport with the values of the U.S. legal system.10 Although minor exceptions
apply, it is generally understood that when foreign bankruptcy litigants are seeking relief on

5

11 U.S.C. 1501(b).
11 U.S.C. §1509.
7
11 U.S.C. § 1520(a)(1).
8
11 U.S.C. § 1509(b)(3).
9
Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163–64 (1895).
10
See Allstate Life Ins. Co. v. Linter Crp. Ltd., 994 F.2d 996, 999 (2d Cir. 1993) (listing eight factors of procedural
fairness to determine if a foreign bankruptcy proceeding aligns with U.S. bankruptcy objectives).
6
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comity grounds (i.e., seeking enforcement of an automatic stay from a foreign country),
recognition is required.11

II.

The Varying Interpretations of Chapter 15 Recognition
a. The Vast Majority of Courts Have Interpreted Chapter 15 as Intending to
Require Recognition Before Comity can be Granted

Courts requiring recognition as a prerequisite to relief in the United States have relied
upon the text as well as the purpose of Chapter 15 in order to support this interpretation.
First, the majority of courts reason that Chapter 15 unequivocally requires recognition,
based on the statute itself. Section 1515 lays out the required, objective elements of an
application for recognition, such as a certificate from the foreign court affirming the existence of
such proceeding.12 If recognition were not a prerequisite to comity, courts have noted, there
would be no need for these requirements to be met from the outset.13 For example, in In re Ran,
Israeli debtor Lavie was denied comity because the court found that he did not have sufficient
pre-petition economic presence in Israel, one of the requirements of an application for
recognition under section 1515.14 The court explained that the factual determination is the first
step in a chain of mandatory steps that must be met for comity to be granted. 15 The court
reasoned that this is due to the rigid structure of Chapter 15 that was intentional in its creation in
order to remedy the problems of section 304. 16 Whereas section 304 relied heavily on judicial
discretion to determine if comity was appropriate, Chapter 15 is based on objective criteria that

11

See 1 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 13.05 (16th 2021).
11 U.S.C. § 1515(b)(1).
13
See In re Ran, 390 B.R. 257, 292 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. June 12, 2008) (“The plain language of Chapter 15 requires a
factual determination with respect to recognition before principles of comity come into play.”).
14
Id. at 301–02.
15
See Id. at 291.
16
Id.
12
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leads to more uniform results. 17 Therefore, the court concluded, “[b]y arguing comity without
first satisfying the conditions for recognition, Lavie urges this court to ignore the statutory
requirements of Chapter 15.”18 A recent decision from the Southern District of Texas, HFOTCO
LLC v. Zenia Special Maritime Enterprise, similarly denied comity to a German company that
failed to file an order of recognition, based on the construction of Chapter 15.19 The Texas Court
explained, “[i]t is clear from the structure of Chapter 15 that recognition is a prerequisite to
obtaining comity from any U.S. court with respect to foreign insolvency proceedings.”20
Second, courts holding that recognition is a prerequisite to comity point to the purpose of
Chapter 15: not only was it created to increase consistency in decisions, it was also intended to
be the only way to commence a foreign insolvency proceeding in the U.S.21 As one House
Report from 2005 reads, “Congress intended that Chapter 15 be the ‘exclusive door to ancillary
assistance to foreign proceedings’ with the goal of controlling such cases in one court. Requiring
evidence of recognition assures adherence to the rule.”22 Chapter 15’s predecessor, section 304,
was not the exclusive means by which foreign representatives could commence a cross-border
case, and did not require a singular venue. 23 As a result, foreign representatives were free to try
their luck in a variety of U.S. courts to get their desired result. 24 As such, most courts have
reasoned that at least one of the purposes of Chapter 15 is to prevent forum shopping through
requiring the filing of a singular petition for recognition.25 Otherwise,

17

Id.
Id. at 292.
19
See 2021 WL 2834687, at *4.
20
Id.
21
In re Loy, 380 B.R. 154, 165 (Bankr. E.D.Va. 2007) citing H.R. Rep. No. 109-31, 109th Cong., 1st Sess. 110
(2005).
22
Id.
23
8 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 1509.02 (16th 2021).
24
Id.
25
See, e.g., In re Bear Sterns, 389 B.R. 325, 333 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2008) (noting that requiring Chapter 15
recognition as a precondition to comity is what “distinguishes Chapter 15 from its predecessor section 304”).
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American Bankruptcy Institute Law Review | St. John’s School of Law, 8000 Utopia Parkway, Queens, NY 11439

[p]arties would be free to avoid . . . the expert scrutiny of the bankruptcy court by
applying directly to a state or Federal court unfamiliar with the statutory requirements.
This section concentrates the recognition and deference process in one United States
court, ensures against abuse, and empowers a court that will be fully informed of the
current status of all foreign proceedings involving the debtor.26
Accordingly, skipping over the recognition requirement would be directly at odds with both the
text and purpose of Chapter 15. 27

b. A Select Number of Courts Have Relied on Common Law Principles of Comity
and the Text of Chapter 15 to Grant Comity Without Recognition
Despite the statutory text and purpose indicating that recognition is a prerequisite to
comity, a small number of courts have interpreted Chapter 15 recognition as discretionary.
Rather than decide if comity should be granted based on whether the debtor has met the objective
requirements of section 1515, these courts have held that the comity determination should rest on
principals of fairness.28 In Moyal, when a German company sought to have its automatic stay
honored by a U.S. bankruptcy court without first applying for recognition, the Southern District
of New York granted comity, finding that such a ruling was appropriate because “the foreign
proceedings [were] procedurally fair and . . . d[id] not contravene the laws or public policy of the
United States.”29 The court agreed with the company that Chapter 15 does not preempt common
law principles of comity, writing that requiring recognition first “is absurd and would fly in the
face of comity principles.”30

26

H.R. Rep. No. 109-31(I), 110 (2005).
See In re Ran, 390 B.R. at 292.
28
See, e.g., Moyal, 539 F.Supp.3d at 309.
29
Id. (quoting JP Morgan Chase Bank v. Altos Hornos de Mexico, S.A. de C.V., 412 F.3d 418, 424 (2d Cir. 2005)).
30
Moyal, 539 F.Supp.3d. at n.1.
27
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Yet such an analysis seems to be directly at odds with the intent of Chapter 15.
Procedural fairness was the main analysis used prior to the enactment of the statute (indeed, the
only cases cited to in the Moyal opinion were pre-Chapter 15 cases) and requires the court to
weigh several factors, such as whether creditors of the same class are treated equally in asset
distribution and whether a foreign country’s insolvency laws favor its own citizens.31 This
analysis is fact specific and much less structured than the rigid requirements of Chapter 15. 32 As
a result, judges who rely on these factors rather than Chapter 15 to determine whether comity is
appropriate are granted a wide amount of discretion. 33 The danger is that this wide amount of
discretion can lead to inefficient and inconsistent rulings in foreign insolvency cases, reminiscent
of section 304.34
Courts holding that recognition is not a prerequisite to comity have also pointed to the
text of Chapter 15 for support. Under section 1509, Chapter 15 filings can only be made by
someone who is a foreign representative—defined in section 101(24) of the Bankruptcy Code as
“a person or body, including a person or body appointed on an interim basis, authorized in a
foreign proceeding to administer the reorganization or the liquidation of the debtor’s assets or
affairs or to act as a representative of such foreign proceeding.” 35 In Trikona Advisers Ltd. v.
Chugh, for example, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the decision to give collateral
estoppel effect to the findings of a Cayman Islands court, even though recognition was never

31

See Allstate 994 F.2d at 999.
See In re Ran, 390 B.R. at 291.
33
See EMA GARP Fund v. Banro Corp., No. 18 CIV. 1986, 2019 WL 773988, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 2019) (writing
that the court was “comforted” in its decision not to require an order of recognition because the foreign proceedings
“satisf[ied] fundamental standards of procedural fairness”).
34
See Anthony Casey & Joshua Macey, Bankruptcy Shopping: Domestic Venue Races and Global Forum Wars, 37
Emory Bankr. Dev. J. 463, 483 (noting that without recognition, conflicting proceedings might occur between or
within countries and lead to inefficiency and forum shopping).
35
11 U.S.C. §1509; 11 U.S.C. § 101(24).
32
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sought.36 The court held that “no party to the district court proceeding is a ‘representative’ of a
‘foreign proceeding,’ as those terms are defined in 11 U.S.C. §101(24) and (23),” and that,
therefore, recognition was unnecessary. 37 The Moyal court likewise relied on a similar argument,
finding that MGKG’s administrator, who was not named in the state suit against it, didn’t qualify
as a “foreign representative” so recognition wasn’t necessary. 38 While a narrow reading of the
statute may support this interpretation, the administrator in Moyal was appointed by a German
bankruptcy court to handle the company’s assets and claims against it—seemingly as much a
foreign representative as any. 39 Therefore, some courts interpret Chapter 15 definitions narrowly
in order to support granting comity without first ordering recognition.
Conclusion
There is ample evidence of legislative intent and textual support indicating that
recognition under Chapter 15 is a mandatory prerequisite to comity; to hold otherwise would
seem to defeat the very purpose of repealing section 304 in place of the more cohesive and
structured Chapter 15. While questions of fairness regarding the laws of the foreign country
should still be considered before comity is granted, this inquiry should be in combination with
and not in place of, a debtor meeting the criteria for recognition. Otherwise, there is potential for
degradation of Chapter 15 and its authority should this trend continue. Although courts finding
that recognition is not necessary are in the clear minority, those that do so risk returning to the
days of section 304 where foreign debtors could forum shop, bankruptcy rulings were
inconsistent, and comity analyses were ad-hoc.

36

846 F.3d 22, 32 (2d Cir. 2017).
Id. at 31.
38
See Moyal F.Supp.3d at n.1.
39
Id. at 307.
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